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ABSTRACT 
Six years ago, a military takeover of Mali’s government caused the country’s 
democracy to crumble, creating further regional instability. Once the coup was resolved, 
Malians and many donors from the international community worked to reinstate civilian 
control over the military and to improve military effectiveness. This thesis investigated 
the impact of that aid on civil-military relations, control, and effectiveness. It found that 
foreign aid has had a low to medium impact so far on civilian control and military 
effectiveness. Foreign assistance has had only a modest effect on the development of 
institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and professional norms. On the same note, 
foreign assistance has had a low impact on Mali’s capability to devise a security plan or 
strategy, as well as to develop inter-agency institutions, even if providing resources to 
train and equip the Malian forces. As violence and terrorism are encroaching, in spite of 
foreign security assistance, there is little impact on military effectiveness. In this context, 
this thesis recommends that the foreign donors continue their efforts to provide security 
assistance to the Malian government, and the Malian elites use the foreign assistance 
more effectively to build better civil-military institutions. 
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Over the past five years, Mali has experienced political, economic, and security 
turmoil. It started in January 2012, when the rebel group called National Movement for the 
Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) allied with terrorist groups in the northern regions of Mali 
and took up arms against the central government. Some rebels were military while other 
rebels dressed as military; all took advantage of people through theft and abuse. Before the 
rebellion, rampant corruption in the highest echelons of military and civilian leadership 
had created popular frustrations that, in turn, provided support for the rebels—at least at 
first. Despotism and nepotism were rampant. Unemployment and insecurity were rising, 
and the economy was in bad shape.  
In March 2012, after two decades of transitioning to democracy, Mali’s democracy 
crumbled in a coup that overthrew democratically elected President Amadou Toumani 
Toure. During this upheaval, Mali saw two-thirds of its territory seized by the combined 
rebel and terrorist group, increasing tensions between the army and civilian leaders. Thanks 
to talks that started in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) in 2013 and the efforts of a newly 
elected officials, the NMLA and the central government in Bamako eventually signed a 
peace agreement in June 2015.1 Despite the peace agreement, however, the NMLA has 
made little effort to respect the accord. 
The 2012 military coup revealed that the Malian government badly needed to 
achieve democratic civil-military relations. Even though Mali had, before the coup, created 
a reasonably sound political and economic society as well as a healthy civil society, it had 
failed in developing strong and capable security institutions and competent civilian control 
of the military.2 Since 2013, Mali has been receiving a considerable amount of international 
assistance to rebuild its social, economic, and political society, and to strengthen the control 
and effectiveness of the security institutions. The assistance also aims to improve the 
                                                 
1 Florina Cristiana Matei, “The Case of Mali,” in Security Forces in African States Cases and 
Assessment, ed. Paul Shemella and Nicholas Tomb, (104–105 (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2017). 
2 Matei, “The Case of Mali,” 104–105. 
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relations between civilians and the armed forces. Foreign assistance has placed Mali at a 
crossroads in reaching domestic goals while under international pressure. The domestic 
goals consist of building a lasting peace and consolidating a democratic state through 
economic and social development. Beside national objectives, Mali also faces the challenge 
of preserving the donors’ interests. Donors’ interests are geopolitical, such as free 
circulation of people, goods and services; strategic, such as stability and the fight against 
drug and human trafficking, and counterterrorism; and economic security for both parties.3 
A. THESIS QUESTION 
This thesis, therefore, assesses the following question. How has foreign assistance 
affected post-2012 Mali civil-military relations, specifically in the areas of democratic 
civilian control and overall effectiveness of the armed forces? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
In a period when international institutions and countries are working together to 
assist Mali to overcome the challenges it faces after the 2012 crisis, this thesis studies and 
analyzes the impact of this security and economic assistance despite the ambiguity of the 
situation. As Mali gains in interest to many countries and institutions, such an analysis will 
help develop the knowledge of international players and how their assistance can shape 
civil-military relations in the long term. 
Prior to the 2012 coup, Mali was on the path to a successful democracy, and this 
research hopes to help Mali return to that path.4 Even though it was not a consolidated 
democracy before the coup, Mali had already made significant progress in political and 
institutional reforms to meet democratic conditions. Its three branches of power—
executive, legislative, and judicial—had existed for two decades. Mali also excelled in 
conducting free and fair elections since 1992. It progressively developed a functioning civil 
society, political society, rule of law, state bureaucracy, and economic society. As quoted 
by Florina Cristiana Matei, “Sako notes, after the 2002 elections, it was accepted, 
                                                 
3 Alexis Arieff, “Crisis in Mali,” Current Politics and Economics of Africa 6, no. 1 (January 2013): 40  
4 Matei, “The Case of Mali,” 111–115.  
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especially among the international community, that democracy was taking root in Mali and 
the country was well on its way to a mature, self-sustaining and stable western-style 
democracy.”5 Mali also strove to institutionalize democratic civil-military relations, yet at 
a slower pace as compared to the rest of democratic progress.6 In this connection, Matei 
notes: “Prior to the coup Mali achieved significant progress in bringing about political and 
economic reforms, it made less progress in developing robust, democratic civil-military 
relations (a tradeoff between democratic civilian control and effectiveness of the security 
sector).”7 In March 2012, however, Mali’s democratic consolidation was halted by a group 
of low-ranking soldiers led by Captain Hamadou Haya Sanogo, who staged a coup against 
the democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Toure (also known as ATT). Since 
the elections in September 2013, Mali re-embarked on the path to democratic institution 
building with foreign assistance.  
U.S. government assistance to Mali, for example, has focused on several objectives, 
backed up by education and training, including a Security Governance Initiative (SGI) by 
President Barrack Obama. According to Alexis Arieff, these objectives consist “of 
promoting stability, democracy, civilian control of the military, and effectively countering 
terrorist threats in Africa.”8 In a congressional hearing (Wednesday, December 5, 2012) 
Senator Christopher A. Coons from Delaware stated that  
there are three simultaneous crises occurring in Malia security, a political, 
and a humanitarian crisisall three of which, in my view, threaten United 
States interest in Africa and require the attention of the U.S. Government 
and the world. That’s why we’ve convened this hearing today, to assess 
developments in Mali and to discuss a path forward to restore democracy, 
to reclaim the north, to stabilize the security situation, and to address 
ongoing humanitarian needs.”9  
                                                 
5 Matei, “The Case of Mali,” 111–115.  
6 Matei, “The Case of Mali,” 111–115. 
7 Matei, “The Case of Mali,” 103. 
8 Arieff, “Crisis in Mali,” 26 
9 Assessing Developments in Mali: Restoring Democracy and Reclaiming the north, Senate, 112th 
Cong., 2nd sess., December 5, 2012, 1. 
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In this spirit, this thesis comes out of the SGI program. On the one hand, this thesis reveals 
insights of Mali’s current situation to U.S. officials, so they can have better understand and 
better assess civil-military relations in Mali. On the other hand, this thesis can help policy 
makers to adapt Malian civil-military relations to the political, economic, and cultural 
structures of the country. The author hopes this thesis will also help Malian civilians and 
military members understand each other and the military role better, which may prevent 
another coup and promote democracy.  
While there is a significant body of scholarship available on civil-military relations 
in new democracies and on foreign assistance in consolidating democracy, there is limited 
literature on Mali and the impact foreign assistance on its democracy, especially on civil-
military relations. This thesis contributes to understanding this challenge.  
C. HYPOTHESES 
Despite both political and security institutions having built strong relations with 
external players, there has been little improvement in civil-military relations. Since the 
events of 2012, however, Mali’s political and security issues have become the concerns of 
the international community, including the European Union, the United Nations, African 
Union, France, and the United States. This interplay of various forms and sources of 
assistance serves different purposes and objectives for the donors. The diverse interests of 
contributors may weigh on the future of Mali, the region, the African continent, and on a 
wider level, the whole world.10 This thesis tests four potential hypotheses regarding foreign 
assistance and civil-military relations:  
1. The foreign security assistance has had little impact on civil-military 
relations since the 2013 elections.  
2. The foreign security assistance has improved civil-military relations, both 
in terms of effectiveness and control. 
                                                 
10 European Commission, “Donor Conference on Mali,” Support and Development of Mali, press 
release, Brussels, May 15, 2013, http://donor-conference-mali.eu/. 
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3. The foreign security assistance has improved democratic civilian control 
of the military but not military effectiveness. 
4. The foreign security assistance has improved effectiveness but not 
democratic civilian control of the armed forces.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much like Bobby Chand found in his Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis on 
Nepal,11 there is a lack of literature regarding civil-military relations in Mali or on the role 
of foreign aid on civil-military relations in the country. However, Mali has received 
substantial assistance, particularly since 2013, and there is evidence that that assistance has 
impacted both civil-military relations and military effectiveness. The following thesis 
adapts Chand’s structure and discusses Malian civilian control and military effectiveness 
in terms of “theoretical aspects,” and “foreign security assistance” to set the stage for 
further analysis.12  
1. Democratic Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness 
Samuel P. Huntington’s core theory on civilian control of the military is based on 
military “professionalism.” Huntington posits that the mechanisms of “subjective” and 
“objective” control are the components of subordination of the military in civil-military 
relations.13 He describes “subjective” and “objective” control in the context of civil-
military relations in democracy. According to him, subjective control is the power of the 
executive, the legislative, and judicial branches on the armed forces.14 The objective 
civilian control encompasses military professionalism, in that sharing power between both 
civilian and military is essential in shaping the professional attitudes and behavior among 
                                                 
11 Bobby Chand, “Foreign Assistance and Its Impact on Civil-Military Relations: A Case Study of 
Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 3–4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/41357.  
12 Chand, “Foreign Assistance.” 
13 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard, 1957), 83. 
14 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 83. 
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the members of the defense forces.15 Huntington emphasizes that, in civil-military 
relations, the structural position of the military within the governing body, the nature of the 
ideologies of the armed forces, and the informal role and influence of the officer corps are 
the main interdependent elements of civil-military relations. Nevertheless, the complex 
balance between authority, influence, and ideology of the military and civilian is measured 
against a particular explanation.16  
Huntington suggests that military autonomy, professionalization, political 
neutrality, and voluntary subordination are dependent variables in democratic civilian 
control. His concept of objective civilian control claims that officer corps should be 
completely autonomous to manage public order, which leads to professionalization, which 
proceeds to voluntary subordination and political alienation, which leads to secure civilian 
control.17 Huntington’s civilian control theories help explain civil military relations in 
mature democracies because they emphasize the United States as an example of the 
process. Contrary to a country that is in the process of rebuilding its democratic institutions, 
such theories are inadequate to explain the complexities of civil-military relations. Mali is 
in the process of reconstructing its democratic civilian control of the armed forces and 
reforming its institutions after a period of upheaval that has affected the country’s civilian-
military relations. Thus, this thesis examines the relations between civilian elites and the 
military for the purpose of understanding civil-military improvement in a new democracy. 
Thomas C. Bruneau criticizes Huntington’s approach in explaining civilian control 
of the military. He states that Huntington is biased in selecting data to support his theory 
of the military as a profession, as a variable to explain democratic civilian control.18 
According to Bruneau, “professionalism,” similar to “culture,” is not a concept to rely on. 
He notes “the qualities that make up professionalism, just like culture, are subjective, 
                                                 
15 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 83. 
16 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 83. 
17 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 83. 
18 Thomas C. Bruneau, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: 
Routledge, 2015), 16–18. 
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dynamic, and changing.”19 He argues that the United States adopted joint professional 
education long after Huntington wrote his book. Furthermore, he considers that military 
education “changed the culture of the U.S. armed forces, something that Huntington 
assumed to be largely static.”20 Another point that Bruneau deems a flaw in Huntington’s 
theory is the latter’s focus on only “objective and subjective models” of democratic civilian 
control of the officer corps.21 As Bruneau insinuates, however, democratic civilian control 
also encompasses effectiveness and efficiency. Bruneau posits that the effectiveness of the 
military consists of fulfilling several roles and missions, which are fighting wars, 
participating in peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, fighting terrorism, and 
fighting against drugs and human trafficking. He states that efficiency is to fulfill these 
roles and missions at a low cost. Although Bruneau’s emphasis on flaws in Huntington 
theories is relevant, it does not suffice to explain civil-military relations in Africa where 
interstate conflicts do not exist, and internal conflict is the main challenge. This thesis 
analyzes the specific mechanism of effectiveness in Mali.  
Rocky Williams, in his article “Towards the Creation of an African Civil-Military 
Relations Tradition,” refers to Huntington’s “objective” and “subjective” control as the 
forms of civil-military relations mechanisms.22 Like Huntington, Williams states that 
objective control encompasses the constitutional, the executive, and the judicial 
mechanisms in democratic civil-military relations in most liberal democracies. Further, he 
clarifies that the efficacy of these formal mechanisms depends on the distribution of power 
among social classes, state elites, and individuals in the given organization. According to 
Williams, objective forms refer to the structure, roles, and the culture of each country. He 
argues that the level of oversight within government, constitutions, and judicial determines 
the acquiescence and monitoring of the armed forces. 
                                                 
19 Bruneau, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 16–18.  
20 Bruneau, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 16–18.  
21 Bruneau, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 16–18.  
22 Rocky Williams, “Towards the Creation of an African Civil-Military Relations Tradition.” African 
Journal of Political Science, no. 3 (June 1998): 20–41. 
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Williams identifies the subjective measures as another form of civilian control of 
the armed forces. According to him, subjective consists of arranging a developing 
partnership between the military, political, and civil society. He implies that partnerships 
among these institutions can facilitate the penetration of the officer corps. He also suggests 
that ethnic and military mission manipulation ensure loyalty of the armed forces to the 
constitution, and prevent their intrusion on the non-military terrain. Williams insinuates 
that monitoring of the military can be established through “counter balances” of civilian 
involvement in the police, intelligence, and para-military agencies. He also proposes the 
creation of a joint political-military management of the defense policy and planning 
process and the involvement of civilian officials in the formulation of security policy. 
Williams adds that subjective forms of civil control of the military include the 
composition of the officer corps.23 He states that balance of power, social and class 
structure of the defense personnel, their corporate identity, their skills patterns and 
operational experiences, and the relations between services in the armed forces are relevant 
to the control and effectiveness of the military. Moreover, he mentions that these will vary 
according to the mode of civil-military relations under scrutiny, and the inter-relationships 
between instances. These relations depend on the political and social culture of the 
country.24  
Karen Guttieri describes the subordination of the armed forces by civilian leaders 
as the prerequisite for civil-military relations.25 According to Guttieri, an elected civilian 
official ordering the military and military alienated from political spectrum are indicators 
of civilian control of the armed forces. Guttieri goes on to note that the respect of the 
military for their civilian counterpart develops expertise in security issues, oversight of 
armed forces capacity, and ensure subordination.26 On the other hand, Guttieri emphasizes 
                                                 
23 Williams, “Towards the Creation of an African Civil-Military Relations Tradition,” 20–41. 
24 Williams, “Towards the Creation of an African Civil-Military Relations Tradition,” 20–41. 
25Karen Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” in Who Guards the Guardians 
and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2006), 236–243. 
26 Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 236–243. 
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the criticism that “civilian high dependence on the military to maintain civil order and 
protect against internal and external threats can reduce its control over the armed forces.”27 
She rejects the view that the powerful and competent the military becomes, as a result of 
procurement of weapons or education programs, the more civilian rule becomes vulnerable 
to military intervention in politics.  
In addition, Guttieri acknowledges that education encompassing military norms and 
beliefs in relation to the executive, the legislative, and civil society is the key to civilian 
military relations.28 According to her, “education of military officers is particularly 
significant in states in transition to democracy. The uncertainties that characterize the first 
steps toward democracy can give false appeal to the apparent certainty of military rule; 
education mitigates the uncertainty that derives from not knowing or understanding.”29 Yet 
Guttieri agrees that education and indoctrination are relevant to civilian control of the 
armed forces. She also states that professionalism of military officers can be relied on to 
guarantee civilian control of the military. In fact, Guttieri suggests several ways of 
achieving military subordination and ensuring obedience.30  
According to Narcis Serra, control is obtained “by observing who takes decisions 
in the field of military policy and by checking the execution of these decisions.”31 Serra 
identifies this process as an element of measuring civilian control of the military. He asserts 
that scrutinizing and containing the military is a restrictive task of civil-military relations.32 
It has a much broader meaning. Serra emphasizes indoctrination of nationalism as an 
important element of control and effectiveness. He draws attention to peace missions, 
disaster relief operations, or collaboration in the struggle against drug-trafficking and inter-
ministerial cooperation as relevant to control and effectiveness. He further argues that 
                                                 
27 Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 236–243. 
28 Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 236–243. 
29 Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 236–243. 
30 Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 236–243. 
31 Narcis Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, 244–247. 
32 Serra, The Military Transition, 245. 
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“civil control of the military is not a set of measures and techniques oriented to prevent 
coup d’état. That would be to restrict this broad concept to a specific, extreme situation in 
civilian-military relations.”33 Serra suggests that limiting civilian control to government 
and the armed forces is narrow.34 He believes that civil society should participate in the 
process. Serra adds that “military must have a margin of autonomy in consistence with the 
role society wants them to perform.”35 Overall, he states that loyalty to the constitution is 
a key element in the control of the armed forces in consolidated democracies.36 All these 
elements contribute to control and effectiveness; however, Serra fails to address the cultural 
and ethnic roles that Williams mentions in explaining control and effectiveness on civil 
military relations in African States. In addition, Serra’s conception of giving a margin of 
autonomy to the military is not suitable in the case of Mali. Because military discussing 
their own budgets in Mali may lead to corruption among high ranking officers who may 
already be corrupt The review will discuss Serra view about control and effectiveness of 
the military and how it has affected Mali’s civil-military relations. 
According to Matei, control is one element of the trinity of civilian leaders over 
security forces.37 Matei agrees with Serra and Williams that a formal mechanism of checks 
and balances contributes to control and effectiveness of the military. Matei asserts that 
control includes institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and accommodation and 
development of professional norms, which may contribute to effectiveness.38 According to 
Matei, “an institutional control mechanism consists of steering security forces by civilian 
leadership in various institutions and organizations managed by professional staff. These 
organizations consist of a civilian ministry of defense for the military, a police led civilian 
                                                 
33 Serra, The Military Transition, 245. 
34 Serra, The Military Transition, 246. 
35 Serra, The Military Transition, 246. 
36 Serra, The Military Transition, 246. 
37 Florina Cristiana Matei “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristina Matei (New York: 
Routledge, 2015), 29–32. 
38 Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 29–32. 
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in an interior ministry, and a civilian as the head of the intelligence agency.”39 Moreover, 
control includes committees to decide on policies and budgeting, and a civilian chain of 
command to define roles and missions, such as National Security Council. Second, 
oversight is the follow-up by civilian leaders on security forces activities in the cadre of 
legal basis; it makes sure that security forces act in respect and obedience to the civilian 
leaders.40 
Matei suggests that in a consolidated democracy, oversight is not merely limited to 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches; it is also exercised by independent 
organizations such as media, non-governmental organizations (NGO), think tanks, and 
other forms of civil society as well as international organizations as Human Rights 
Courts.41 Last, professional norms involve transparency in the processes of “recruitment, 
education, training, and promotion,” that match the objectives of the democratically elected 
officials, therefore embedding the mechanisms of institutional control and oversight.42 
Some of these ideas are relevant to the situation in Mali. However, transparency in the 
process of recruitment, education, training, and promotion is influenced by the individual’s 
adherence to the government in power, or relationship to decision makers in the political 
elites or high rank military.  
Moreover, Matei and Serra share the view that to measure the control level 
exercised by national and international authorities, security forces have to fulfill six major 
security roles: wars, internal wars, terrorism, crime, humanitarian assistance, and peace. 
These roles are exercised at the national level; however, an international level also defines 
the roles, but focuses mainly on wars, terrorism, humanitarian assistance, and peace 
operations.  
While control focuses on the civilian authorities, a mechanism of effectiveness 
complements civil-military relations in a consolidating democracy. According to Matei, 
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“effectiveness is best determined by whether or not the security institutions are prepared to 
fulfill any of the previously introduced six roles assigned to them.”43 Effectiveness, 
however, cannot be measured on military success in war fighting. For instance, “while the 
United States was successful during the initial wars against the Taliban and Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, it was not successful at the post 
conflict stages.”44 The effectiveness requirement includes the outcome of all other roles 
and missions mentioned earlier.  
According to Abbas Kadhim, who argues based on the case of Iraq on effectiveness 
of the military, “effectiveness of the defense forces is not measured by the armed forces 
strength to conduct their duties and carry out the missions that the civilian leaders assigned 
to them, which involve defending the country against external and internal threats.”45 He 
says, “Doctrine and training are not sufficient in effectiveness, but also equipment 
necessary, logistic, and other forms of support to combat units; and provide the ability of 
coordination to succeed in a large-scale conflict.”46 Kadhim’s argument about logistics and 
equipment support to the armed forces mirrors the case of Mali where the military lacks 
equipment and logistics to fulfill their roles and missions. In addition to what was 
emphasized as effectiveness are the scale of motivation of the defense forces and the desire 
to serve and to protect the civil society. Thus, this research measures the effectiveness of 
the armed forces as a servant of the civil society, as well as the military’s degree of 
motivation.  
2. Civil-Military Relations and Foreign Security Assistance 
Serra mentions in his book The Military Transition that external players can have 
both negative and positive impacts on civil-military relations.47According to him, this 
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impact depends on “their importance or the direction in which they might be pushing.”48 
He notes “the twentieth century illustrates examples of experiences that lead in every 
possible direction.”49 In quoting Laurence Whitehead, Serra observes “in peacetime 
external factors can only play a secondary role in re-democratization.”50 Serra emphasizes 
that Whitehead refers to the negative and ambiguous roles played by the United States in 
Latin American. Conversely, Serra states that European countries’ democratic support 
during the 1970s in the transition in the three southern European countries was successful 
in the process of democratic consolidation. Moreover, Serra asserts that NATO contributed 
significantly to the political construction during the early stage of democratic 
consolidation, which he notes that was the goal desired by citizens in these countries.51  
In civil-military relations, foreign security assistance can be effective in some 
sectors while in others it can be ineffective, as Diana Molodilo and Valeriu Mija emphasize 
in the case of the Republic of Moldova.52 According to Molodilo and Mija, Moldova’s 
partnership with the European Union has helped the country in the process to consolidated 
democracy and civil-military relations. They state that the Moldovan parliament adopted 
“the key normative acts that regulated the system.”53 Nonetheless, civil-military relations 
in Moldova are still far from being effective, particularly in civilian control.54 For example, 
consider that the constitutional court ruled against the president’s decision ( 1994 - 1996), 
after he fired Division General Pavel Creanga for “incompetence and corruption.”55 For 
Molodilo and Mija, this case revealed the weakness and fragility of democratic civilian 
control and oversight. While foreign assistance was not effective in civilian control of the 
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armed forces, it was effective in 1997 with the appointment of the first civilian Minister of 
Defense. According to the authors, this “was a positive breakthrough in democratic civil-
military relations.”56 Moreover, they state that contributions from international experts 
such as those from the NPS Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) in Monterey, 
California, helped Moldova in its civil-military relations. “For the first time, 
representatives from civil society were invited to participate” in defense commissions 
review.57 In addition, they observe “civilian and military advisors from NATO and its 
partner states have provided assistance to Moldova in its reform efforts.”58 According to 
Molodilo and Mija, this enabled Moldova to participate in exercises in peacekeeping 
missions and humanitarian relief actions.59 They argue that this assistance has had positive 
impact on Moldova civil-military relations. Thus, foreign security assistance can improve 
or deteriorate democratic civil-military relations. 
 Foreign security assistance is driven by certain factors that can influence the 
amount of aid provided by the donors. According to Piotr Lis, “foreign aid is often claimed 
to serve as a tool to promote social and economic development, which may be hindered if 
a country experiences an episode of armed conflict or increased terrorist activity.”60 He 
goes on to say violence and instability can impede donors’ aims for assistance due to many 
reasons. The first motive concerns the destruction of human and tangible assets, which may 
impede the recipient’s strength, and affect donors’ interests. In addition, domestic tensions, 
corruption, and misuse of aid funds can discourage donors from providing assistance.61 
Moreover, Lis asserts that the presence of adverse groups within the recipient state may 
affect donors’ action for the fear of supporting one group rather another. On one hand, this 
situation may hinder the engagement level of donors who are committed to non-
involvement in foreign countries’ internal affairs; on the other, it may push other donors to 
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increase their assistance if it serves their strategic interests.62 According to Lis, while 
multilateral donors focus on government quality, policies, and reduced military budgets, 
bilateral donors are more prone to provide additional assistance for geopolitical concerns, 
strategic alliances, and colonial history.63 .  
Lis also emphasizes security issues as another factor that drives allocation 
decisions. Lis argues that states with a global interest in their effort to fight terrorism 
provide security assistance to avoid terrorism spreading to their homeland. This assistance 
may be direct or indirect,64 including to “other areas such as education or healthcare,” or 
agriculture, which in turn may free up monies to fight terrorism.65 Thus, security factors 
may initiate aid flows. 
Furthermore, Lis considers that the role of religion is relevant to how aid gets 
allocated. Since “a large share of terrorism has been driven by Muslim”66 fundamentalists, 
it can affect foreign donors’ decisions. Although Mali is approximately 95 percent Muslim, 
the country receives a large amount of assistance from diverse donors. 
In his testimony, Dr. John Hillen, the Assistant Secretary for the U.S. notes, 
“Security assistance is a critical foreign policy tool that allows … promoting key American 
values with respect to democracy, human rights, and civilian rule of the military.”67 
According to Chand, Hillen also mentions “The United States provides training, advice, 
and assistance to the militaries of developing countries as a security assistance to further 
its foreign policy goals. Washington asserts that employment of such instruments helps to 
achieve the goals in a cost-effective way. It allows the U.S. to have political influence and 
encourages attitudinal changes in the host country.”68 This emphasizes what Lis points out 
about multilateral donors being more prone to provide additional assistance for geopolitical 
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concerns and strategic alliance. This is relevant in explaining the United States security 
assistance to Mali in many different sectors, such as democracy promotion, inter-
ministerial relations, and the fight against terrorism in the Sahel regions.  
For decades, the United States has provided assistance to Mali. “In FY 2016, U.S. 
foreign assistance to Mali totaled more than $125.1 million with $117 million expected for 
FY 2017.”69 The U.S aid package aims to support the June 20, 2015 peace accord signed 
between Mali and armed groups.70 At the same time, “U.S. interests in Mali include 
promoting democracy and improved governance; promoting regional security by 
combatting”71 terrorism and human and drug trafficking; reducing poverty, improving the 
quality of life in Mali, and encouraging sustainable economic growth.72 U.S. assistance in 
Mali can have both negative and positive effects on civil-military relations.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis assesses the impact of foreign security assistance provided to Mali by 
the European Union, United Nations, African Unions, France, and the United States on 
civil-military relations. After detailing the current situation and examining the assistance, 
the thesis uses Matei’s framework as a basis to assess the impact. 
The research draws from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources 
consist of government documents, newspaper, reports, press releases, and the author’s 
personal experiences. Due to the current and ongoing issues tied to the event, primary 
resources include recent writings and assessments. Secondary resources dealing with 
different aspects of civil-military relations include books, journals, other individuals’ 
assessments, and literature.  
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis has five chapters. Chapter I introduces the problem, background, 
literature review, and research methods. Chapter II analyzes foreign security assistance to 
Mali since the re-democratization process began in 2013. Chapter III analyzes the structure 
of democratic civil-military relations since 2013. Chapter IV assesses how foreign security 
assistance has impacted civilian control over the military and military effectiveness using 
the framework developed by Matei. Finally, Chapter V concludes with a synthesis of the 
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II. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO MALI SINCE 2013 
Since its independence in 1960, Mali has depended heavily on foreign assistance. 
This assistance has come in many forms, including economic, political, security, and 
humanitarian. In the aftermath of the 2012 political and security upheaval, however, the 
international donors’ conference on Mali held in Brussels, presided over by France and the 
European Union (EU), pledged the largest amount in terms of dollars in economic, 
political, humanitarian, and security assistance in Mali’s history. Mali received between 
$3.5 billion and $5 billion from diverse donors.73 According to Christopher Holshek, the 
amount is more than $4-billion,74 which is equivalent to Mali’s current national budget. 
The assistance came over a period of five years to help the economic, political, and security 
sectors, and essentially aimed “to rebuild a new Mali.”75 This is the first time that Mali has 
received such a huge sum to reshape its failed institutions and its weak security and 
economy.  
Although this assistance seeks to contribute to strengthening government 
institutions in Mali, as well as increasing Mali’s security and stability, it also aims at 
developing economic, political, and civil-military relations. Moreover, the assistance 
reinforces security in the Sahel region. Donors see Mali as a key player in safeguarding the 
stability of the Sahel region, the African continent, and even the world, particularly against 
terrorist groups and transnational organized crime.76 As a strategic state, Mali has become 
indispensable to the security of its neighbors and in the fights against many illicit activities 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as drug and human trafficking. Mali thus received various 
types of assistance from players with diverse goals and interests during the international 
donors’ conference. Indeed, while much of the aid has been motivated by the growing 
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importance of the country, particularly the strategic role Mali plays in the region, each 
donor country or organization has contributed to Mali’s foreign assistance efforts according 
to its own interests and goals. The United Nations (UN), EU, France, the United States, 
United Kingdom, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar all have strategic, economic, security, 
and political interests in Mali. Both the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) have regional, strategic, political, and security 
interests. Post-coup, Mali has also received assistance from hundreds of international 
NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, the Red Cross, the World Food Program, and the 
United Nations Refugees Program. Thus, foreign aid continues to be a major source of 
governmental development projects. In fact, for the full year of 2016, foreign aid 
contributed to 25 percent of Mali’s national budget.77 
This chapter reviews Mali’s bilateral and multilateral relations with the EU, AU, 
the UN, and France, which all contribute to providing personnel skills, training, equipment, 
and other resources to improve the effectiveness of Mali’s security sectors. It also reviews 
the assistance provided by the United States as support to improve both security and 
governance in Mali. 
A. OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN UNION AID  
There are long and strong multilateral relations between the EU and Mali. These 
relations are economic, political, and security based. Both Mali and the EU play significant 
roles in helping each other develop and strengthen their bilateral and multilateral relations. 
Mali holds an important place in EU policy as it is an easy access point to Libya 
and on to Europe for human and drug trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, and illegal 
immigration. The EU fears that a weak security force in Mali creates instability in the Sahel 
regions, therefore creating a flow of immigration to Europe that can threaten European 
                                                 




security.78 The EU also fears that an unstable Mali could be a safe haven for terrorists. 
These are some of the drivers of EU assistance to Mali. The EU also provides economic 
aid to reduce the vulnerability of indigenous populations to these types of threats, which 
partially explains the motivation behind the engagement of 22 European nations, including 
five non-members of the EU, responding quickly to the Malian crisis.79 
Under these circumstances, since the 2012 crisis, Mali has received much assistance 
from the EU. Data shows that, post-coup, the EU has provided different sectors in Mali 
with financial assistance at around 327 million euros.80 This assistance has aimed to help 
train and advise the military of Mali in order to increase the Malian security forces’ 
capacity to defend the country’s territorial integrity and to combat terrorism. In addition, 
the assistance aimed to build a strong and professional security force capable of launching 
operations against internal and external foes, to restore territorial integrity, and to face 
threats posed by terrorist groups.81 The aid, largely allocated to investment in infrastructure 
development projects, also aimed to help the Malian economy to bounce back. 
The courtship between the EU and Mali has gained momentum since 2013 as the 
assistance has increased, which, therefore, expanded the EU’s mission. At first, the mission 
called the first Malian Battalion was under the command of French Army Brigade General 
Francois Lecointre. The Battalion was named “Waraba” (“The Lion” in Bambara), a name 
chosen by Malian Soldiers themselves as the official name.82 After, there were a second 
and third Battalion, named “SAMA” and “ELOU,” meaning “Elephant” in Bambara and 
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Tamashek, respectively. Later, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) agreed with 
the government of Mali to expand and extend their mission to other activities besides 
training and advice.83 “After France and Germany, Belgium became, in 2016, the leading 
nation of this mission.”84 With the expansion of the EUTM mandate, the mission focused 
on the river Niger loop and the areas of the municipalities of Gao and Timbuktu.85  
In addition to assistance related to the security sector, the European Union Training 
Mission in Mali (EUTM) is intended to improve command and control, logistics, human 
resources, the respect of the international humanitarian law, the protection of civilians, and 
the understanding of human rights in the Malian armed forces. Furthermore, the EUTM 
role is also to strengthen the conditions for adequate control over the military by legitimate 
civilian authorities.86 
In addition to this assistance, the EU participated in Mali’s peace process, which 
resulted in a signed agreement on June 18, 2015, between Mali and different groups in the 
country’s northern provinces; however, the agreement’s goals have not been implemented. 
Moreover, the EU played a major role in helping Mali organize free, fair, and transparent 
presidential and legislative elections in 2013. In addition, upon request from Malian 
authorities and in coordination with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), EUTM contributed to the disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process of ex-combatants; framed by the peace 
accord, EUTM provides training sessions in order to build a strong and coherent Malian 
military.87 The DDR process, however, still has not been implemented by any of the 
participants of the accord.  
The EUTM also supports the five Sahel Joint Forces (G5) that consist of Mali, 
Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Chad. The EUTM aim is the enhancement of 
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coordination and interoperability within the G5 Sahel national armed forces to secure the 
Sahel region in Africa.88  
B. AFRICAN UNION ASSISTANCE  
Mali is among the founding nations of the African Union, which is headquartered 
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. African Union interests in Mali include security, political, and 
economic ones. Concerns as an important player in the stabilization of the continent, Mali’s 
security is relevant to the African Union because it can affect the security of the whole 
continent. An unstable Mali has critical ramifications for the economic, political, and 
security aspects of the continent. Instability in Mali can also hinder the economic activities. 
Moreover, it can destabilize the continent from the spillover of growing terrorism and illicit 
activities.  
As a continental player, the African Union provides aid to Mali focused primarily 
on security, political, and economic frameworks. Since 2013, however, the AU has 
operated as a mission under the umbrella of the United Nations to support Malian 
democracy and crack down on terrorism and human rights abuses. As a key player in the 
early stage, in its effort to help Mali regain its territorial integrity and to organize a free 
and fair election, AU assistance to Mali since 2013 has also focused on humanitarian relief 
missions.89 Moreover, the African Union mission in Mali has also consisted of 
investigating any human rights violation by both the Malian security forces and the 
separatist groups allied with terrorist groups.90 Over time, the AFISMA mission changed 
to a peacekeeping mission operating under the name of the United Nations Multi-
Dimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali, or MINUSMA.91 According to Christopher 
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Holshek, “The African-led International Support Mission to Mali ( AFISMA) of over 8,000 
troops, mostly from ECOWAS countries under Nigerian command, will give way to the 
MINUSMA of 11,200 troops and 1,440 police in time for the elections.”92 
C. UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE  
UN assistance has been significant in Mali since the beginning of the crisis in 2012. 
Different from the previous two, the UN assistance programs to Mali have involved 
humanitarian relief, peacekeeping missions, and civil-military relations.93 
Besides the vote on Resolution 2085 at the United Nations in 2012, which helped 
Mali in regaining its territorial integrity, the UN missions also focus on participating in 
humanitarian relief, on civil-military relations, and on peacekeeping in Mali.94 
Humanitarian relief assistance helps populations in the northern regions of Mali 
(Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal) and central regions (Mopti and part of Segou) affected by the 
crisis get access to food and clean water. This aid also facilitates the transportation of 
logistics between the supplier and the beneficiary, and enables those populations to 
participate in infrastructure work such as building roads and health facilities. Moreover, 
the UN also contributes to maintaining peace between those supporting the unity of Mali, 
which include such pro-government groups as Gatia, Ganda Koy, Ganda Izo (in the local 
Songhai language) and the separatist groups favoring the division of Mali, such as the 
NMLA, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), and the Arab Movement of 
Azawad (AMA). Further, the UN contributes to maintaining peace between the 
secessionists and the Malian Army. UN assistance to Mali also includes civil-military 
coordination through the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
program.95 The civil-military coordination program requires military intervention by the 
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Blue Helmets to provide direct assistance to populations affected by the crisis by 
distributing food and sanitary equipment. The program also offers indirect assistance and 
infrastructure rescue, which consists of repairing roads and rescue relief.  
The ultimate purpose of these programs is to develop better civil-military relations, 
so that civilians do not perceive the military as a threat to their lives. As stated by Boly 
Diene (UN-CMCoord), “the interaction and dialogue between civil actors of humanitarian 
relief and military in emergency assistance situations is indispensable in order to protect, 
and to promote humanitarian assistance, to avoid rivalry, to reduce a possible 
incompatibility, and nevertheless, pursue the commons objectives of the aid or 
assistance.”96 These activities relieve tensions between populations in the north and the 
military, tension created by the rebellion that led to many deaths of both soldiers and 
civilians. Such actions would also enable the military to focus on their main mission in 
order to reach a common ground for the betterment of Mali, and on civil-military relations. 
D. FRENCH ASSISTANCE  
France and Mali have had historical, political, and economic relationships. Mali 
achieved its independence from France on September 22, 1960, after the dissolution of the 
Malian Federation, composed of French Sudan (the former name of Mali) and Senegal. As 
a former colonial power, France’s rules influenced Mali in many ways,97 including the 
adoption of the French language and the use of a currency (Francs CFA) pegged to the 
Euro currency and guaranteed by the French treasury. Moreover, many laws in the Malian 
constitution emanate from the legacy left by French rule. France and Mali have bilateral 
and multilateral relations. Both countries belong to the Organization International de la 
Francophonie. In addition, there are an estimated 120,000 Malians living in France and an 
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estimated more than 5,000 French citizens living in Mali.98 These relations explain part of 
the French military’s intervention in Malian conflicts. 
In this context, it should not come as a surprise that, among all donors, France has 
the biggest interest in Mali. These interests are economic, security, political, and 
geostrategic. As the interests of a former colonial power toward Mali have been continually 
unclear since the 2013 intervention, however, Mali could be a center of gravity for France 
to get its hands back on sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, its natural resources.99 So far, 
France’s mission to protect its economic interests in Mali has been successful because 
France has been so far able to stop the advancement of terrorist groups.  
Moreover, France has done well in protecting its assets as well as its citizens. 
France’s economic interests rely on huge investment by French companies in Mali and 
neighboring Niger (where the French energy company Areva has been extracting uranium 
for decades).100 These companies include the giant petroleum company Total, Bollore’ 
African Logistics (Manutention Mali), the communication and telephone companies RFI 
and Orange, respectively, and the infrastructure enterprise SATOM. Other small 
companies, such as CFAO MOTORS and SECURICOM, are also present in Mali. From 
the author’s experience listening to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius, 
who gave a speech in 2015 in Mali, French companies in Mali made revenues of over 500 
million Euros in 2014 alone. Thus, an unstable Mali would threaten French interests in 
both Mali and Niger. Yet, these are not the only interests that France holds in Mali. There 
are currency ties between France and Mali that play a big role in why France intervened in 
Mali in 2013: specifically, the CFA (French Colonies in Africa, currently called 
Community of French in Africa). A strong economy in Mali would be an advantage for 
France because France guarantees the CFA.  
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The security interests that France has in Mali involve combating terrorism, 
immigration, drug and human trafficking, kidnapping of French citizens in northern Mali, 
and protection of French companies’ assets in Mali. Fear from the spillover of growing 
terrorism in Mali may affect French citizens living in Mali or even transcend boundaries 
to the French territory. France backed Mali in 2013 in order to thwart the spread of 
terrorism. When it comes to immigration, over the past decades, the instability in Africa 
has driven many refugees and immigrants into exile in Europe, particularly in France. This 
massive movement toward Europe carries with it the risk of terrorists as well as drug and 
human traffic. Immigration threatens the security of France, and a stable Mali can play a 
significant role in slowing down their refugee crisis. Moreover, kidnapping of French 
citizens in northern Mali in exchange for ransom by terrorists and human traffickers had 
grown rampant.101  
Another aspect of French security interest is the signing of the defense accord 
between Mali and France, which the French signed partially to justify their military 
presence in Sub-Saharan Africa.102 This military presence in Mali enables France to control 
resources in Sub-Saharan Africa. Installing their military base in Mali gave the French an 
opportunity to defend their interests in the Sahara region and further into African continent. 
According to one Malian officer, “the military materials and other types of materials 
brought by the French in Tessalit proves that they are not about to leave anytime soon … 
[S]ince the beginning, the French had a hidden agenda to Malians…. They came in sub-
marines.”103 Taking that officer’s words into account, France does seem to have reached a 
long-standing objective in controlling Tessalit, in the Kidal region of Mali; as he states, 
Tessalit is the icing on the cake for the French, as many doors are now opened for them in 
Mali. France’s military presence now seems pervasive in Mali, and France has access to 
Malian defense systems.  
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After 15 months of intervention, France has partially accomplished some of its 
missions. French forces have freed all the French hostages; they defeated the terrorists; and 
they have established their military base in Sub-Saharan Africa.104 They seem to have 
accomplished a long-standing objective and can now sit back and enjoy the ride in terms 
of harvesting natural resources, thus, keeping their hands on Africa through the 
geostrategic location that is the northern regions of Mali, especially Kidal. Hence, all these 
factors could explain the importance of Mali for France in economic, political, security, 
and geostrategic terms.105 
Given this background, as a former colonial power, France has taken the lead in the 
Malian crisis with their intervention to liberate Malian territory from terrorist groups, 
drugs, and human traffickers. This assistance, however, was not the only aid that Mali 
received from its former colonizer. Mali also receives official developmental assistance 
from France. Moreover, France provides every year in a bilateral relations, a budgetary 
complement to Mali. The multilateral type of economic assistance came when the French 
led the donors’ conference to help Mali receive significant financial support from various 
global partners for Mali’s recovery from its economic crisis post-coup in 2013. In terms of 
security, France is the main actor in mobilizing funds for the G5 Sahel, which is composed 
of security forces from five Sahel countries: Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and 
Mauritania.106 These organizations have been operational since 2017 with France as the 
main coordinator. At the same time, Mali continues to receive security and economic 
assistance from France. 
E. U.S. ASSISTANCE 
For decades, U.S.–Mali relations have been based on mutual support of promoting 
democracy, reducing poverty through economic growth, building effective security forces, 
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and developing more secure governance.107 Moreover, both the United States and Mali are 
members of many “international organizations, including the United Nations, International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. Also, Mali is one of twelve 
member countries of CILSS (Permanent Interstates Committee for drought Control in the 
Sahel) of which the U.S. is one of the sponsors.”108 
In this context, the United States aims to help Mali build a secure, peaceful, 
prosperous, and democratic state that can contribute to regional development.109 On 
December 5, 2012, according to the Opening statement of Hon. Christopher A. Coons, US. 
Senator from Delaware who Stated that “ Today’s focus is on Mali, and as we speak, there 
are three simultaneous crises occurring in Mali- a security, a political, and a humanitarian 
crisisall three of which, in my view, threaten United States interests in Africa and require 
the attentions of the U.S. Government and the world. That’s why we’ve convened this 
hearing today, to assess developments in Mali and to discuss a path forward to restore 
democracy, to reclaim the north, to stabilize the security situation, and to address ongoing 
humanitarian needs.”110  
At the same time, the United States also has geostrategic interests in Mali. These 
interests are motivated by the United States’ commitment to combat terrorism, drugs, and 
human trafficking in the world.111 “Mali plays a significant role in fighting against these 
threats where they are growing.112 Moreover, Africa is the center stage of world attention, 
where Mali plays a significant role. 
While after the 2012 military coup the United States had suspended its assistance 
to Mali for a short time, U.S. multilateral and bilateral assistance to Mali has remained 
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strong. The assistance was linked to the 2013 elections, which ended with the election of a 
democratic president and a legitimate National Assembly. Notably, the United States’ 
commitment to assist Mali was demonstrated during the international donors’ conference 
in Brussels in 2013 by Christopher Holshek, who declared:  
“The United States has no choice but to embrace the sound underpinnings” 
of ‘leading from Behind.’ (Like “containment” at its start or “restrainment” 
now, it’s better than it sounds.) Of the more than $ 4 billion pledged in 
Brussels by over 80 countries, the U.S. anted up about $200 million, which 
will not come until after the election at the end of July.”113  
In addition to humanitarian, security, and economic assistance, the United States 
has increased its aid to Mali over the last few years, expanding its assistance into other 
areas. Thus, with a view to helping Mali recover from the 2013 crisis, the Obama 
administration increased security assistance to Mali. In an effort to improve civil-military 
relations, the U.S. Government, in cooperation with the Malian government, created the 
Security Governance Initiative program, or SGI. The goal of the program is to create a 
national security council composed of civilians and military who are currently studying for 
a master’s degree in Strategic Studies. This program will develop inter-ministerial 
coordination in Mali. The program is inspired by the U.S. system; allowing greater 
understanding of civilian military relations, contributing to responsible governance, 
improving the security system, respecting and recognizing international laws on human 
rights.114 So far, it is not suitable to assess the impacts of the program because it has just 
begun; however, the objective is that through such programs there will be improvements 
in civil-military relations, in civilian control of the armed forces, and in military 
effectiveness in Mali.  
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III. DYNAMICS OF DEMOCRATIC CIVIL–MILITARY 
RELATIONS IN MALI SINCE 2013  
Since the return to democratization in 2013, civilian elites in Mali have endeavored 
to bring about democratic civil-military relations, in terms of democratic civilian control 
and oversight of the military as well as effectiveness of the armed forces. Since the election 
in 2013, members of the military returned to the barracks, and the armed forces are under 
civilian authority. The armed forces remain neutral.  
Each of the four sections of this chapter examines individual control and oversight 
aspects of civil-military relations since Mali’s return to democracy in 2013. Specifically, 
each section explains the role played by different branches of power to strengthen civilian 
supremacy over the military. This chapter also analyzes the political neutrality and the 
effectiveness of the armed forces since the country’s return to the re-democratization phase. 
Moreover, the discussion examines the role of foreign actors in shaping the relations 
between civilians and the military during the period of Mali’s post-coup transition and re-
democratization.  
A. DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT OF THE 
MILITARY 
In Mali, democratic civilian control of the security sector is rooted in the 1992 
constitution. Control and oversight are exercised by the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches. Additional oversight is exercised by the media and civil society.115 
1. Executive Control 
Executive control involves shared responsibilities between the president and the 
prime minister. The president is the supreme commander of the armed forces and guarantor 
of the constitution. The prime minister and cabinet oversee the implementation of the 
defense and security-related policies. The executive branch oversees the direction and 
guidance of major parts of the security sector. The executive branch also includes the 
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Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs, who is in charge of the land forces, air forces, 
gendarmeries, and the Coast Guard. Prior to the elections in 2013, a military leader was the 
head of the Ministry of Defense (MoD). However, this changed after the presidential 
election. Since the country’s return to a democratic regime in 2013, “Mali’s MoD has been 
led by a civilian. The civilian-led Ministry of Defense is in charge of recruitment within 
the defense sector as well as of providing the military with the required equipment, 
logistics, and training related expenses. The Ministry of Interior and Civil Protections is in 
charge of the police and civil protections (which is the combined fire department and 
paramedics) and the president’s cabinet is in charge of the intelligence community.”116 
Under these circumstances, after the 2013 elections, with the assistance of the 
international community, the defense sector came back under civilian control. The country 
returned to a democratic path where a civilian was appointed as Minister of Defense. Thus, 
when a civilian Minister of Defense, Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga, was appointed, all the 
powers and responsibilities were shifted from the garrison of Kati where the junta was 
headquartered to the MOD. The chief of the army reported to the Defense Ministry instead 
of the chief of the junta, Sanogo. The MOD regained its full functionality with civilians in 
control of the armed forces. Although a civilian was the head of the MoD and Veterans 
Affairs, there was still imbalance in terms of management. Even today, the military 
dominates by the defense staff that has only five civilian personnel, who are in charge of 
the procurement of military hardware, policy, budgeting, and recruitment. Civilians remain 
the decision makers in terms of management, but the advisors to the MoD are all military. 
Civilian control of the armed forces is strong but military effectiveness still weak.  
2. Legislative Control and Oversight 
Legislative control and oversight of the security sector in Mali is executed by the 
Defense and Security Commission in the National Assembly. The members of the Defense 
and Security Committee are mostly civilians with one retired general from the national 
police. The commission is in charge of all defense-related issues.117 It analyzes the defense 
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budget before submitting it for a vote in the parliament. Even though the Minister of 
Economy and Finance defends the national budget in the National Assembly, the defense 
budget has to be approved by the commission first.118 The commission also visits the 
defense headquarters to get knowledge of military living conditions and all other security 
forces’ needs. In case of dysfunction, the MoD, the Joint Chief of Staff, and others in charge 
of the security sector, particularly high-ranking officers, are often called for parliamentary 
hearings to explain the reasons for the breakdown. For example, when Prime Minister 
Moussa Mara visited north Mali in May of 2014 and rebels killed eight government agents, 
the prime minister, the MoD, and high-ranking military were called for hearings.119 
Moreover, articles 051 and 052 of the of the reorganization of the security forces 
were voted in the National Assembly to create crisis management commissions that include 
all services of the security sector in each region of the country for emergency response to 
crisis.120 The assembly voted to authorize auditing by different agencies, including the 
Comptroller General (General Verification) of defense spending, which seemed to be 
nonexistent prior to the elections. Before, there was no auditing of defense spending.121 
Prior to the elections, some military expenditures were treated secretly among members of 
the executive branch; there was no control or oversight on that military spending. Prior to 
the elections, there were also some loopholes in the military auditing process that allowed 
military expenditures not vetted by any agency. This violated the financial act of 1995, 
which stipulates that all government institutions are subject to auditing. In contrast to the 
civilian sectors, military expenses lacked control and oversight by independent agencies. 
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The introduction of auditing in the defense budget, however, was conditioned by 
foreign donors’ pledges. The donors’ assistance required transparency in the defense 
spending. The international community assisted Mali financially as well as in human 
resources to organize a free and fair legislative election in November 2013. This election 
helped Mali to establish a legitimate assembly. Assistance from diverse contributors 
supported the Malian National Assembly to obtain full legitimacy in the eyes of the armed 
forces. Nevertheless, there were weaknesses in relation to the control and effectiveness of 
the parliamentary oversight. As Christopher Holshek states, “While the committee on 
defense has asked members of the military hierarchy security-related questions and 
attempted to play its oversight role, parliamentary supervision and control over all aspects 
of the budgetary process is weak.”122  
The legislative control and oversight over the armed forces improved slightly, 
which contributed to the effectiveness of civil-military relations. To begin with, the 
relations between legislators and the armed forces—which were tense before and during 
the couphave improved. As, for example, in 2014, when then Malian Prime Minister 
Moussa Mara visited Mali’s northern regions of Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal, and the 
government agents were killed. These events happened after foreign military provided 
training to the Malian troops. Yet, the National Assembly proceeded with the 
interpellations of high-ranking officers in the armed forces for hearings about the military 
defeat in Kidal. This happened to be the first time in Malian history that high-ranking 
officers had been called for a hearing in the parliament. Nonetheless, this is evidence that 
despite resistance from the armed forces, legislative control and oversight of the armed 
forces have improved since the 2013 legislative election.  
3. Judicial Control 
Article 95–042/AN-RM of the 1995 law established the code of military justice in 
Mali. The National Assembly ratified this law on February 16, 1995, and it was 
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promulgated by the president on April 20, 1995.123 This code of military justice states that 
“ in peace time like in war time, military justice has the power to judge any military 
personnel either an officer or non-officer, who commits a crime at the workplace, barracks, 
on an airplane, on ship, or in any military establishment while stationed or not.”124 The 
code also stipulates that the Minister of Defense is in charge of authorizing any pursuit 
against the military personnel accused of any criminal action or infraction. Further, the 
Minister of Defense can work with the Minister of Justice to proceed to the procedural 
penal according to statutes and regulations of civilian court.125 
Yet, the military has not made any effort to enforce the law. At present, disciplinary 
actions are the only sanctions taken against Mali’s military. No trial had taken place in the 
court martial since the adoption of the law. Military justice is non-existent. The law exists 
only de jure; de facto, it is never put into use. For instance, in 2016, Amadou Haya Sanogo 
and 16 other members of the military accused in the deaths of 21 red berets were tried in 
civilian court.126  
In all, little improvement has been made in judicial control mechanisms since the 
2013 elections. The constitution gives the regular court of justice the competency to review 
cases regarding military personnel outside of the defense sphere. Any military personnel 
accused of any criminal act in any context is tried under the jurisdiction of regular courts. 
Civilians conduct the investigations if any member of the military is charged with breaking 
the law. New laws have been enacted, however, to enforce the military justice system that 
can bring military personnel who committed crimes during the coup under the jurisdiction 
of the military court. With the assistance of and pressure from foreign donors like NGOs 
and think tanks (Human Rights Watch), so far, a few high-ranking officers are currently on 
trial and others are under investigation for murders and atrocities committed against 
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civilians and fellow military involved in a confrontation between the green berets and the 
red berets during the 2012 coup attempt. This is the first time that high-ranking officers, 
especially generals, have been brought to regular justice.  
4. Civil Society Oversight  
The media and civil society have attempted to step in as watchdogs of the executive 
and legislative efforts to develop civil-military relations in Mali since the elections of 2013. 
After the election of the current president, families of red berets who disappeared during 
their clash with the green berets have demanded justice. Multiple national and international 
newspapers reported and commented on atrocities and human rights abuses committed by 
the junta. Thus, the Malian Government opened an investigation in September 2013 on the 
deaths of the red berets during their confrontation with the green berets during the previous 
year’s coup attempt.127 A few months later, the investigators discovered 21 bodies in 
Diago, a village near the garrison where the junta was besieged. The Minister of Defense 
summoned some members of the junta, such as General Amadou Haya Sanogo, General 
Yamoussa Camara, and General Dahirou Dembele, for the deaths of the red berets. This 
happened in September 2013, less than a month after the inauguration of the current 
President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.128 Then, they later were indicted for crimes against their 
fellow service members. The charges are still pending after several appearances in court, 
which took place in Sikasso, a region located 364 kilometers from Bamako.  
This incident heralded the power of civil and political societies control mechanisms 
such as the media, NGOs, and political parties in controlling the armed forces indirectly.129 
This action from the government sent a strong signal nationally and in the international 
arena for the willingness of the country to implement democratic rules. This asserts control 
of the armed forces by civil and political societies. Thus, the relations between the military 
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and civil societies have improved over the past two years to the point where the national 
army is getting major support from the national audience as well as the international 
community, especially in fighting terrorism in the Sahel Region in Africa. Foreign 
assistance has played a major role in keeping the military under the control of civilians. 
Together, pressure from international media, civil society, political society, think tanks, 
and human rights groups, has had a positive influence on civil-military relations.  
In addition, there is a new Commission on Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation to 
investigate the atrocities and human rights abuses committed by the separatist and terrorist 
groups as well as the military, to situate responsibilities.130 Moreover, the commission also 
has the role to reconcile different communities in the North, and to build trust between 
security forces and the civil population (society). 
Recently, NGOs reported many human rights violations. For instance, on February 
21, 2018, in the village of Daresalam, nine men were arrested and brought to an undisclosed 
area where they were later found dead.131 The local population pointed to the Malian armed 
forces, which they believed executed the men.132 This atrocity was discovered after 
Amnesty International reported on the testimony of a few witnesses.133 The Amnesty report 
put pressure on the central government to open an investigation. Similarly, on October 2, 
2017, Human Rights Watch met with the Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs, Tiena 
Coulibaly, and other high ranking officers, to discuss their findings on human rights 
violations by the military. As a result, the minister and his department expressed their intent 
to investigate these allegations and bring to justice all the perpetrators. As Corinne Dufka, 
an associate Africa director at Human Rights Watch, states, “the Malian Defense 
Ministry’s expressed support for investigating alleged military abuses recognizes that 
counterterrorism operations depend on respect for human rights”134 She further says, “This 
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is a significant step, but for full accountability, the military’s disciplinary proceedings 
should be accompanied by appropriate criminal investigations by the Justice Minister.”135 
Besides that, the NGO promises to conduct its own investigations on human rights 
violations committed against civilians as well as, according to the code of war, the terrorist 
and Islamist armed groups operating in the northern and central regions.  
B. MILITARY POLITICAL NEUTRALITY  
Despite distrust in the political environment, the national army remained neutral 
over the past four years. The military returned to the front to fight against terrorism and to 
maintain the integrity of the territory. It did not attempt to intervene in the political scene 
since the elections. For instance, in December 2017, the army remained in its barracks 
during the national protest against the current government and the parliament during the 
crucial event of the central government’s aim to change the 1992 constitution.136 The 
military non-intervention in the protests demonstrated the armed forces are taking positive 
steps toward civilian control of the national army.  
Although the military remained in the barracks during the civil protest, some 
incidents involving members of the military have caused civilians to view the armed forces 
as a threat to Malian democracy. As an example, a couple of soldiers were arrested for their 
recent declarations that they support Amadou Haya Sanogo, leader of the junta, and also 
for their criticism of the current president by stating that the executive failed to secure the 
country and the defense institutions. Another incident led to the arrest of 29 gendarmes 
after they criticized the Director of the Gendarmerie for their living conditions in the central 
region of Mopti.137  
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C. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MALIAN ARMED FORCES SINCE 2013  
Grudges and distrust between the national army and the parliament put enormous 
pressure on the legislative branch in 2013. The parliament and the executive power made 
little effort to maintain strong and sustaining armed forces in terms of training, equipping, 
and preparing the security sector against imminent threats the country was currently 
experiencing. A few reasons explain these perceptions within the military, especially 
among subordinate soldiers who believed that the military was the last concern of the 
national assembly because they counted less for their electoral constituency. The view was 
parliamentarians were more concerned about their political party’s survival. Moreover, a 
few reasons may account for the perceived attitude that parliament was ignoring military 
issues through its total lack of vision, inadequate security knowledge, and rampant 
corruption that took over the National Assembly.138 Therefore, the security sector was at 
the mercy of the rebels and terrorist groups. These factors played a major role in the 
relationship between the military and legislators, which eroded not only the control of the 
military but also its effectiveness. 
The military was not a major priority to the executive. Even though it was part of 
their plan in theory, the armed forces were not their priority in practice as many members 
of the executive branch were focused on both their personal interests and those of their 
political party. For instance, in 2015, less than two years after the elections were held, 
several members of the government were involved in corruption scandals. These scandals 
related to the purchase of military equipment and led to financial sanctions imposed on 
Mali by institutions like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
As a result, many ministers were excluded from the central government.139 These scandals 
also created a lack of trust between the executive and the armed forces. This created 
tensions between security forces and the executive power.140  
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In 2014, when then Malian Prime Minister Moussa Mara visited the northern 
regions of Mali, in particular Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal, a confrontation occurred 
between the Malian troops and the rebels of the NMLA allied with terrorist groups in Kidal. 
The clash started after the rebels and terrorist groups took hostage some Malian officials, 
including the prime minister in the government building. After the rebels slaughtered eight 
Malian officials and agents, the Malian armed forces launched an offensive to liberate the 
remaining hostages. Unfortunately, the Malian military offensive was a strategic failure, 
following a retaliatory response from the combined groups of NMLA and the terrorist 
group Ansar Deen and its affiliates. The fight ended with the defeat of the Malian army, 
which led to the loss of the eighth region of Mali (Kidal) to the rebels.141 Therefore, the 
international community stepped in to demand a ceasefire, and ask both the Malian forces 
and the rebel groups to withdraw their troops from their initial positions. The event 
heightened tensions in Bamako, where the civil population and some military personnel 
accused the executive branch of not providing enough resources to the armed forces.  
After both the legislative and presidential elections, military effectiveness grew as 
the security became the priority of both the executive power and the parliament; the newly 
elected government proposed a budget increase for security forces reform. The new budget 
program established by the government in 2015 was for an amount of 1,230,000,000,000 
CFA (or an estimated 2 billion USD), for a period of five years (2015–2019); the same year 
it was adopted by the National Assembly on March 2015.142 The resources allocated for 
the security forces were to improve the conditions of the armed forces, such as salary 
increases, allowances, rations, training, logistics, and equipment. The program also 
involved military education and professionalism. As a result, military effectiveness has 
improved slightly.143  
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As of late, foreign assistance has had a positive impact on military effectiveness. 
After EU assistance to train Malian security forces to be more effective in facing different 
scenarios, military effectiveness has improved somewhat. In 2017, the armed forces 
succeeded in an operation in Mopti that led to the freeing of the President of the High Court 
of Justice who was taken hostage by members of the terrorist group led by “Amadou 
Kouffa,” a branch of Ansar Deen.144 Other similar events demonstrating military 
effectiveness are the terrorist attacks at the Radisson Blu Hotel in 2016 and at encampment 
Kangaba” in 2017, during which the military conducted successful operations such that the 
terrorists were neutralized and hostages liberated.145  
D. CONCLUSION  
Despite the reinstatement of Malian democracy through successful elections and 
foreign assistance, civil-military relations have made little improvement. Even though, 
over the past five years, the country saw the signing of a peace agreement, a presidential 
election, a legislative election as well as some municipal elections, civil-military relations 
in Mali still need improvement, in particular, in the relations between political leaders and 
the armed forces. 
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN 
ASSISTANCE ON CIVILIAN CONTROL AND 
MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS 
SINCE 2013  
Over the past five years, as Mali has returned to democratic consolidation, foreign 
assistance has endeavored to strengthen the relations between civilian leaders and the 
armed forces. This chapter discusses the impact of the foreign assistance on civil control 
of the armed forces and the effectiveness of the military. 
A. ASSESSMENT: FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO THE CASE OF MALI 
Applying Matei’s control and effectiveness framework to the case of Mali since 
2013, this thesis arrives at the assessment shown in Table 1. The qualifier in each cell 
indicates the present level of each subcategory of control and effectiveness in the context 
of civil-military relations.146 
Table 1. Impact of the Foreign Assistance on the Level of Civilian 
Control and Effectiveness of the Malian Armed Forces 
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1. Institutional Control Mechanisms 
With regard to the institutional mechanisms subcategory, the impact of the foreign 
assistance to Mali is “low-medium.” International donors’ contributions have only been 
partially successful in improving those mechanisms since the country’s return to 
democratic rule. For example, while foreign assistance to civil-military relations has helped 
reinstate civilian authority over the military, develop civilian-led security institutions—
including a Ministry of Defense—and preserve military neutrality in politics, foreign 
assistance has not prevented the appointment of military members as heads of both 
intelligence and the interior security and civil protections departments. Thus, the National 
Police are militarized and the structure of the defense personnel has not altered despite 
foreign effort to reshape security institutions. There are only two civilians working in the 
cabinet, including the MOD, and one as an advisor whose role is to help the defense 
minister make decisions in respect to the laws. On the other hand, there is a member of the 
military in charge of military finances. He makes sure military expenses follow the general 
principle of the 1996 financial law and accounting act.147 The rest are military.  
When it comes to the Ministry of Interior Security, no civilian is working in that 
department. The intelligence community has both civilian and military working in the 
institution, but the intelligence agency is led by a military member. As such, Mali still lags 
behind in terms of institutionalizing de facto democratic civilian control of the armed 
forces. 
One particular area where foreign assistance has dedicated considerable efforts is 
creating civilian expertise and mutual understanding between the military and civilian 
elites in Mali. In this connection, the Obama administration’s Security and Governance 
Initiative program, or SGI, financed ten Malians, civilian and military from different 
ministries (Defense, Justice, Interior Security, Finances, and Foreign Affairs), in a two-
year study and training program at NPS in Monterey, California. The United States showed 
significant interest in bilaterally assisting Mali in the SGI program. The SGI program 
                                                 




brought these students to NPS in a Foreign military sale (FMS) program, enabling them to 
research with both civilians and military personnel. These students graduated from the 
strategic study curriculum of the NPS National Security Affairs (NSA) Department. 
According to Matei, this SGI program will help Mali boost its expertise and knowledge in 
civil-military relations and inter-ministerial coordination.148 This author believes that the 
SGI program will lead to the creation of a National Security Council in 2018, which mirrors 
the one in United States. As of this writing, this is the plan set by Malian authority but has 
not yet been concretized. The program could result in a big turnaround in the institutional 
control mechanism, which demonstrates U.S. engagement to support Mali in strengthening 
its institutional control mechanisms.  
Nevertheless, despite major donors’ efforts to strengthen civil-military trust in 
Mali—as a way to strengthen democratic civil-military relations—the arrests of the leaders 
of the 2012 military coup has fueled tensions within the armed forces and also between 
civilian authority and those military loyal to Captain Sanogo. The military loyal to Sanogo 
is still reluctant to heed civilian supremacy. For instance, in January 2018, a young sergeant 
named Oumar Keita recorded a video on YouTube declaring that leaders and high ranked 
officers are the reasons that the Malian army is not effective.149 Thus, another reason for a 
“low-to-medium” score in this category of the framework corresponds to the poor 
conditions experienced by the low ranked officers, while high ranked officers and civilians 
in charge of the defense department are enjoying all the advantages.150 As an example, in 
2017, some soldiers in the frontline complained of not receiving the remuneration to which 
they are entitled. They felt left out by their hierarchy as well as by the civilian authority. 
They believed that decision makers are not trustworthy and, most of the time, do not honor 
their promises. They also believed that corruption has affected the department at a level 
such that civilian leaders have less concern for the well-being of the armed forces than they 
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do for their personal interests.151 Such behaviors have affected the military morale and 
created frustration within the armed forces, with negative consequences for the country’s 
security institutions.  
Overall, then, the international arena’s contribution to Malian institutional control 
mechanisms has been moderate. 
2. Oversight  
Mali scores “low to medium” in terms of impact of foreign assistance on oversight 
since 2013. While oversight is exercised by the three branches of power—executive, 
legislative, and judicial—as well as the media, it has been less than perfect, despite 
international donors’ efforts to strengthen it. At the National Assembly, there is a defense 
commission in charge of defense and security-related issues. Although foreign assistance 
has not directly contributed to the creation of the commission, the United Nations Mission 
in Mali (UNMISMA) has been actively engaged in supporting the work of the committee 
and increasing the expertise and knowledge of the members of the committee. According 
to an International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) report, the assistance provided 
by UNMISMA to Mali’s defense committee “involves support through workshops and 
meetings to help members of the National Defense Commission in the parliament exercise 
their security sector reform monitoring role and strengthen their capacities, in particular by 
sharing experience with their counterparts in the region.”152  
In terms of judicial control mechanisms, the United States assisted Mali through 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs in 2015 by launching a 
five-year plan (2016–2020) of 690 USD to support the re-establishment of the judicial and 
correctional system.153 On paper, the Malian civilian court has the authority to try the 
military. Despite resistance from the armed forces, the court tried military personnel 
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involved in crimes, human rights abuses, and atrocities. As for the military justice system, 
only minor cases are prosecuted, but bigger corruption or criminal cases have not yet been 
tried. Additionally, the international arena has supported Mali’s Commission on Truth, 
Justice, and Reconciliation, whose role is to investigate atrocities committed by the Malian 
security forces, the rebel groups, and the terrorist groups during the 2012 rebellion.154 The 
commission also has a role to reconcile different factions and groups, including building 
trust between the populations in the northern regions of Mali and the security forces, a 
major priority of foreign donors.155 In order to strengthen the task of the commission, the 
EU, in cooperation with the central government, has established a program called “the 
Steering Committee of the Normalization and Resilience,” which aims to improve the 
framework of civil-military relations and build trust between the armed forces and the 
population.156 This committee was been created in 2017.157 So far, little assessment can be 
made on this committee. 
One area of oversight that the international arena has been unable to help strengthen 
in Mali is budgetary oversight. Despite a robust military budgetary process on paper, 
comprised of the financial law and accounting act of 1996,158 parliamentary budgetary 
oversight has been week due to lack of expertise and lack of information about military 
expenditure, despite foreign assistance efforts to increase the knowledge and expertise of 
civilians. What is more, although there is a defense committee in the legislature, many 
military expenses are not fully revealed to the parliament. The expenses are categorized 
under defense secrecy, which plagues parliamentary oversight.159  
One oversight area where foreign assistance has had a positive impact is the 
informal oversight by civil society and the media over the defense and security sector in 
Mali. At the minimum, the international arena has pressed the Malian government to allow 
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freedom of speech, press, and association. At the maximum, the international community 
has been able to reprimand Mali for violations of these freedoms. In this regard, despite 
intimidation, arbitrary arrests, manipulation, and kidnapping of public informers for the 
media,160 the press in Mali has been able to expose wrongdoing in the government and 
bring about reforms. For example, the news report by the press on the 2014 financial 
scandal in the defense sector led to the discharge of several members of the government, 
including the minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs and the finance minister.161 When 
the press informed the public about financial irregularities and violation of the public 
market code as well corruption within the defense sector, it resulted in international 
economic sanctions on budget aid provided by the EU, IMF, and WB.162  
Another incident the media reported on was the MOD’s attempt to cover a terrorist 
attack in the center of Mali that led to the loss of much military equipment and the debacle 
of the national army163 The media investigated the issue and came out with the true version 
of the attack. This put pressure on the executive (specifically, the president) and ended with 
the firing of the defense minister.164 Nevertheless, there are still challenges to the freedom 
of the press and the power of the press to fulfill its role as Mali’s fourth estate. For instance, 
despite the push in the international arena for the media to act as Mali’s fourth estate, the 
press still faces threats from the central government and the security forces; also some 
deputies use their legislative power to influence journalists and radio talk show hosts. In 
2015, for example, a journalist was arrested for informing the public about the executive 
cover-up of clashes between Malian armed forces and terrorist groups, and the dysfunction 
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of the defense department.165 This information created tension in Mali, and resulted in a 
public protest ended with two dead, the destruction of the courthouse, the firing of the 
defense minister, and the resignation of the justice minister.166  
Moreover, intimidation and death threats targeting members of the media 
continue.167 The central government censors social networks, for example, to impede the 
dissemination of information.168 Foreign players, though, have addressed these issues, 
warning the authorities of human rights violations and arguing for the freedom of the press. 
Amnesty International documented three different cases in Bamako of physical aggression 
and verbal abuse directed at individuals opposed to the referendum that was supposed to 
be held in July 2017. As declared by one member of Amnesty International Gaetan 
Mootoo, “public debate tensely tensed approaching constitutional review must not expose 
dissenting voices to attacks and verbal threats”169 Moreover, many other cases of abuse of 
journalists and bloggers have been condemned by Amnesty International. Among them 
was “the shooting on July 25th at one in the morning of the blogger Madou Kante, who later 
survived [his] wound. During the same month Salif Diarra, a journalist at Mali Actu, 
declared (talked) of receiving anonymous death threats.”170  
3. Impacts of Foreign Assistance on Professional Norms 
The impact of foreign assistance on professional norms is “low-medium.” Due to 
continuous financial support, education and training, as well as advising, Malian security 
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forces have become more disciplined and have improved their corporateness.171 There is 
an improvement in terms of hierarchical chain of command. In addition, foreign assistance 
has brought about incremental positive changes in the military in terms of the code of 
military justice.172 The law consists of giving power to military judges to prosecute any 
military member who commits a crime.173 Therefore, the security forces are less involved 
in atrocities and have better relations with civilians compared to their position during the 
2013 pre-elections, and this improvement is due to foreign assistance donors’ efforts.  
Their efforts to professionalize the Malian military, however, have not been 
successful in every aspect. For example, as of today, there is no exact known number of 
Malian soldiers, and the payment of soldiers still uses an old-fashioned method. Most 
soldiers receive their salary in cash, instead of by electronic transfer that would enable 
comptrollers from different control agencies to keep track of expenses. These practices can 
be impediments to the institutional function because even dead and retired military 
members can be counted as military members. Thus, these practices can affect donors’ 
efforts; it can create highly corrupted institutions and opportunities for corruption to spread 
in the security forces sphere.  
4. Planning and Strategy 
In terms of planning and strategy, foreign assistance has had little impact; the score 
is “low-medium.” Some positive steps have occurred. A defense agreement has been 
signed between Mali and France to help fight terrorism and human and drug trafficking.174 
With assistance from the EU, France, and the United States, a robust strategy has been 
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developed to create the G5 Sahel, which is now operational.175 Although this G5 
contributes to regional security, there has been little evidence so far that could demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the plan.  
Despite the developed plan by the Malian security forces and the presence of French 
troops, there has been an increase in attacks, and insecurity is encroaching on the Mali’s 
central regions, in particular Mopti and Segou. Moreover, there are “low-to-medium” 
scores in terms of strategy, demonstrated by the May 2014 event in which rebel groups 
defeated Mali’s National Army and took control of the northern region of Kidal during 
Prime Minister Moussa Mara’s visit there. 
5. Institutions and a Strong Ministry of Defense  
Foreign assistance to Mali has had a “low-medium” effect in the institutions 
category. EU involvement in the restructuring of the MOD and the support of the in the 
creation of the National Security Council (NSC) show the donors’ willingness to help shape 
security institutions.  
Foreign assistance has led to the creation of the Special Forces for Anti-Terrorism, 
(FORSAT; Forces Special Anti-Terrorists) a unit that derived from battalions trained by 
the EUTM. It is a combined force from different security forces corps (police, gendarmerie, 
National Guard, and red berets) and has been created by the Malian Government to operate 
under the Ministry of Interior Security.176 The plan is to help in special operations related 
to terrorist attacks, drug trafficking, and organized crime. So far, they have been effective 
during the attacks on Le Campement Kangaba resort in 2017, which resulted in the killing 
of the attackers, and only two dead recorded on the special forces’ and the hostages’ side.177 
In comparison to the attack at the Radisson Hotel in Bamako where more than 20 died, this 
operation demonstrates that military effectiveness has improved. 
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Nevertheless, there is little cooperation between security institutions. For instance, 
A Seminar Held in Bamako which the author attended; one participant says that “during 
the attack on the Radisson Hotel Blu, the police, the gendarmerie, and the National Guard 
had no framework in coordination because they did not know which agency had to lead the 
operation.”178 The SGI program can help to close the gap in inter-ministerial coordination 
and permit the recruitment of more civilians in the defense and interior security areas 
through the training and formation received at NPS.179 
6. Effectiveness: Resources 
Mali’s contributions from diverse donors have had little impact on the resources 
category; the score is “medium.” France and the EU co-chaired the donor conference in 
Brussels in 2013, and France provided logistic and equipment support to Mali’s defense 
and security forces.180 “The EU set an emergency trust fund in 2015 to address issues such 
as unregulated immigration and forced displacement, security and development, and 
economics which are some of the causes of instability.”181 Specifically, the UN provided 
resources to rehabilitate and equip government facilities in the North.182 The United States 
mobilized funds bilaterally with the SGI program, and multilaterally through USAID, 
which funded many training and study programs for Mali’s security forces.183  
On the other hand, in 2014, with support from the EU, the IMF, and WB, the 
executive and legislative branches took necessary measures to provide Mali’s armed forces 
with an adequate budget to increase security forces personnel, equipment, logistics, and 
training, and to improve military conditions in order for the armed forces to increase their 
effectiveness. For this reason, in 2014, a new five-year planning, programming, and 
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budgeting system (Lois de Programmation Militaire, or LOPM) bill was proposed by the 
executive branch and passed to the legislature, where the National Assembly approved the 
bill the same year.184 The bill aimed to provide an equivalent of 2 billion USD in funding 
for the security forces over a five-year period. Two years later, the legislature approved 
another bill establishing an internal security program (LPS), also for a period of five years 
(2017–2021).185 This law provides 446 billion FCFA (an estimated 850 million USD). The 
law consists of closing the deficiencies noted at the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil 
Protection.186  
As the previously mentioned ISSAT paper noted, “[T]he adoption of this law is part 
of the implementation of the Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation resulting from 
the Algiers peace process,”187 which is one of the donors’ priorities. Mali’s defense budget 
continues to increase; according to a 2018 IMF report:  
the share of security spending in Mali’s budget has been increasing, making 
the preservation of much needed spending on social services and 
development investment challenging. A year before the crisis, military 
spending, as a share of public expenditure was 8.4 percent (2.1 percent of 
[gross domestic product] GDP), however by 2013 this has risen to 11.4 
percent (about 2.9 percent of GDP), and in 2017 it was 16.5 percent of 
spending (3.8 percent of GDP). The security needs are part of security 
planning and public protection act, which provides for enhancing human 
resources management (recruitment, training, and career path) for police 
and security staff.188  
Despite this increase in security spending, this factor earns a “low-medium” score. 
This “low-medium” score is the result of unlawful use of resources provided by donors to 
improve the effectiveness of the armed forces. In addition, nepotism and corruption among 
elites in both civilian and military institutions have hindered effectiveness. Recent scandals 
about the alleged misuse of resources for other than intended purposes created frustrations 
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on the donors’ side. For instance, in 2014, both the minister of Defense and Veterans’ 
Affairs and the financial minister were involved in corruption scandals regarding the 
purchase of military equipment.189 These scandals led to the sanctions of Mali by the World 
Bank, EU, and IMF, and it also created frustration among donors.190 As a result, the Malian 
security forces remain inadequately equipped.  
B. CONCLUSION 
Despite foreign assistance efforts to help Mali develop an interest and expertise in 
guiding and monitoring the activity of the armed forces, as well as on strengthening 
civilian-led institutions and boosting civilian knowledge on defense and security, progress 
in terms of democratic control and oversight remains precarious, in particular due to 
corruption and cronyism. In addition, Mali is still experiencing terrorist attacks and 
insecurity, and, therefore, needs continued assistance to be strong and effective against the 
threat environment.  
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V CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
How has foreign assistance affected civil-military relations and military 
effectiveness in Mali since 2013? 
As Mali continues to go through a series of political, economic, and security crises, 
its civil-military relations continue to challenge both the civilian authority and the military. 
Thus, this ongoing situation has triggered foreign donors to help Mali reshape its civilian 
authority over the armed forces and build from the ground up a security force to fulfill its 
roles and missions: to defend its territorial integrity and to fight terrorism, internal wars, 
drug and human trafficking, and organized crime.  
A. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID ON CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS IN MALI SINCE 2013 
The thesis used the framework set by Matei as a tool to assess the impact of foreign 
aid on civil-military relations in Mali since 2013. It found that the foreign assistance has 
had only minimal impact on the “control and effectiveness.” Based on examinations and 
analyses done by the author, assistance from various donors ranked at different scores for 
impacting “control and effectiveness.” Despite assistance from donors, Mali’s institutional 
control mechanisms score “low to medium.” Although there has been some improvement 
in civilian control over the military, the security forces are still reluctant to accept civilian 
supremacy. This reluctance relates to the country’s history of military coups since 
independence in 1960 and the belief that security forces need to take over whenever civilian 
leadership fails to fulfill its roles and missions or to provide the military with necessary 
equipment, resources, and living conditions to defend the country. Oversight does happen 
by the institutions and media; however, this control still scores “low to medium” due to 
corruption, nepotism, and cronyism in both civilian institutions and the military. These 
practices have hindered oversight in the military recruitment process, training, and 
education despite foreign involvement. 
The process of oversight has made little progress in Mali. Although states and 
organizations in the world have provided assistance to help Mali re-establish its already 
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weak executive, judicial, and legislative branches, these branches have made minimal 
efforts to improve the mechanism of oversight. Rules and regulations to develop 
transparency and accountability in the security sector were already embedded in the Malian 
constitution since 1992; however, foreign efforts to restructure oversight by the three 
branches of government have made little progress. Although there are agencies in 
executive, legislative, and judicial institutions as well as an independent general auditor to 
oversee military budget and expenditures, the process of oversight remains de jure because 
de facto these rules and regulations are rarely implemented by any of these branches. 
Corruption, lack of transparency, cronyism, and lack of accountability seem to spread in 
the security sector. Authors of these practices act with impunity, and an environment of 
mismanagement and unlawful expenses is encouraged. This environment also harbors 
other activities such as nepotism and inefficiency. However, over the past five years, 
pressure from foreign donors such as the EU, the IMF, and the World Bank led to the 
discharge of cabinet officials alleged to have been involved in the 2014 financial scandal 
in defense budget management. Therefore, foreign assistance has influenced control and 
oversight mechanisms in Mali.  
Over the past five years, the media in Mali has made minimal impact in improving 
control and oversight mechanisms. Furthermore, several challenges have thwarted the 
media’s attempts to play its role as a watchdog in democratic institutional reforms and on 
the relationship between civilian and security forces. Decision makers seek to influence, 
intimidate, manipulate, and politicize the media, which may have been relevant to the 
oversight mechanism in Mali. Lack of professionalism and instances of corruption are 
common in the Malian press. In many cases, journalists and bloggers do not make any 
effort to inform the public based on reliable sources. Instead of working to provide the 
citizens with relevant information, many are at the service of the central government. They 
are bribed and sometimes blackmailed by officials to keep secret any unflattering or 
potentially damaging information the press has on them, and officials may even provide 
journalists with unreliable information. Nevertheless, the few publications that provide 
relevant and reliable sources of information in order to improve transparency and 
accountability in government are often under government pressure, threats, intimidation 
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not to reveal the information. Journalists are sometimes arrested and accused of lack of 
patriotism. In a democracy these practices hinder the media to fully play its role of public 
informer. While the first is based on spreading rumors based on reliable sources, the latter 
is victimized and influenced by the executive branch. Therefore, control and oversight in 
Mali remain weak. 
When it comes to military professionalism, we can assess that foreign assistance 
has improved the professional norms in the security sector in Mali. This improvement is 
linked to training and education provided by various donors to the Malian armed forces. 
Malian security forces are more professional. The military mostly respects international 
and human rights laws. In contrast to their behavior during pre-elections in 2013, Malian 
security forces are less involved in abuses and atrocities on the civilian population. In most 
cases, terrorists and other bandits when arrested are handed over to the justice system. 
Moreover, the Commission on Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation is operational to bring 
justice and accountability to those who committed crimes during the 2012–2013 armed 
conflict. Therefore, foreign aid has influenced professional norms in the security forces in 
Mali since 2013. 
Foreign assistance has had little impact on the plan and strategy for the requirement 
of military effectiveness. The assistance role in training and setting strategy, however, has 
helped Mali to develop a regional security force (G5) that operates in the Sahel regions to 
fight terrorism, human and narcotics trafficking, and organized crime. The assistance has 
also contributed to train Malian armed forces to defend the country’s territorial integrity 
and secure its borders using the police, gendarmerie, and National Guard. In addition, 
foreign aid has supported the peace agreement between rebel groups and the central 
government, which includes the cantonment of the rebel group, and the disarmament, 
demobilization, and reinstatement of ex-combatants. This is a big step in the stabilization 
process; nevertheless, there is little effort made by the protagonists to implement the peace 
agreement. Mali also signed a defense accord with France to help protect Mali’s vast 
territory. Thus, there is also the presence of UN peacekeepers in the north and center of 
Mali. There is little evidence, though, supporting improvement in the effectiveness of 
security because insecurity continues to spread in these areas, and there is an increase in 
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violence and atrocities by the terrorists and bandits on the civil population. Therefore, 
assistance from various donors has had little impact on the effectiveness of the security 
plan and strategy. 
Diverse donors continue to assist Mali as the country develops its institutional 
frameworks to improve effectiveness and build better democratic civil-military relations; 
however, a significant gap remains in this process. In the defense sector, although the 
military is under a strong and functioning civil authority, military members remain in 
charge of both the interior security and the intelligence agencies. At the same time, the 
executive branch strongly influences both the interior security and the intelligence areas. 
The intelligence apparatus works under secrecy and its budget remains secret. It follows 
guidance and directives from the president and the agency’s inner circle. Moreover, instead 
of gathering intelligence, the agency relies on spreading rumors and abusing journalists 
and peaceful citizens. As a result, there is less effectiveness, which is an impediment to 
institutional development and renders foreign assistance less effective.  
In terms of resources, donors have made efforts to support Mali’s limited resources 
with equipment, training, and education to improve its already failed security system. Yet, 
the assistance has mostly focused on training and education, which is not the only 
assistance that Mali needs to improve its military effectiveness. In addition to training and 
education, in order to fulfill its roles and missions, the Malian armed forces need 
equipment, logistics, and advanced technology to improve the effectiveness of its armed 
forces. Although France has provided some security materials, this material seems to be 
insignificant in terms of the size of the armed forces. Moreover, specialists have assisted 
Mali’s government in the recruitment and training processes. Despite this effort from 
various donors, the Malian recruitment process is still plagued by nepotism, corruption, 
and cronyism. On a positive note, though, there has been an improvement in resources 
since 2013. In 2014, the central government proposed a law on planning, programming, 
and budgeting, which the assembly passed the same year. The law aimed to provide 
necessary equipment and logistics, and to improve military living conditions over a period 
of 2015–2019. So far, little improvement has been made in terms of actually equipping the 




After the analysis and examinations made on foreign assistance and civil-military 
relations in Mali since 2013, this study found gaps and weaknesses that need remediation. 
Focusing on control and effectiveness, foreign donors and decision makers in Mali need to 
take further steps to resolve these gaps and weaknesses in civil-military relations in Mali. 
First, diverse donors have to identify Mali’s goals in improving civilian control of 
the armed forces, strengthening oversight, and fighting terrorism and organized crime. 
Moreover, donors have to set a standard for countries to receive aid funds. Donors have to 
make sure that Mali reaches such expectations in terms of results in all their different 
assistance programs. Moreover, donors should evaluate their aid, then come out with better 
tools and approaches to mitigate failure and to improve the effectiveness of this assistance. 
In addition, Mali’s performance handling prior aid should determine subsequent assistance. 
Further, donors should consider broadening the scope of their assistance. Rather than 
focusing their aid on training and education only, they should consider providing 
equipment and logistics that are adapted to the recipient country standards.  
Although Mali has received equipment from various donors, these assets have often 
been limited in quantity; moreover, security forces do not receive training on how to use 
this equipment. Therefore, the equipment remains unused and becomes a burden for the 
recipient country. In addition, with its limited resources, Mali cannot afford to maintain the 
donated equipment and logistics. They are either too costly to repair or there is lack of a 
qualified personnel to fix the equipment. Therefore, foreign donors should provide 
assistance that can fit the recipient country’s capabilities. 
To the government of Mali, this thesis has the following recommendations. Mali 
needs to use the advisory, logistic, and resource based foreign aid to fight corruption, 
strengthen democratic institutions, increase professionalism of the armed forces, and boost 
the expertise of policymakers. 
Control and oversight at the institutional level have to be strengthened. Checks and 
balances have to be re-established and enforced in practice. The executive influence on 
different institutions must diminish. The three branches of governmentexecutive, 
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legislative, judicialhave to boost the capabilities of the oversight and control institutions, 
as well as the expertise and knowledge of those who are conducting oversight. Toward this 
end, the foreign assistance programs—education, training, exchanges, advisory, 
equipment—should continue. Independent agencies also must have the freedom to exercise 
their oversight without outside influence. Moreover, a reduction in political leverage, 
nepotism, corruption, and cronyism is required. Creating different institutions and agencies 
to reinforce control and oversight, and making sure they are implemented, can reduce or 
even eradicate these counterproductive practices. 
In addition, the media should have the freedom to inform and educate the public 
without the meddling of the three branches of government. Most important, journalists 
should be protected by laws. Mali should continue to train and educate the security forces 
to respect rules and regulations, as well as human rights. Furthermore, authorities should 
punish any violation of these rights and regulations. Impunity should not be encouraged, 
because it erodes trust between civilians and the military.  
Moreover, the government of Mali should set a plan to improve military 
effectiveness by creating barracks in different regions. More recruitment, training, and 
education should be made on both the security sector and civilian sides. This will enable 
each to have knowledge of the other’s sector. This can improve civil-military relations in 
Mali. It will also enable the civil population to help the armed forces to fulfill their roles 
and missions. Both civilian and military institutions should coordinate their efforts better, 
which the SGI program can improve. This SGI program can also improve interagency 
coordination with expertise. Further, the government of Mali should consider creating a 
center of intelligence analysis to assess daily threats at the national and international level. 
In addition, the government of Mali should consider creating a center for civil-military 
relations where people can receive training and education on intelligence, security, and 
civil-military relations.  
Malian security forces should be equipped and trained to meet the requirement of 
effectiveness. The budget allocated to the security sector should be used for its main 
purpose instead for personal or political interests. In addition, some people seem to be 
untouchable by the law in the security sector as well as in civilian institutions. These 
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practices should be remediated because they impede institutional control mechanisms and 
oversight. The executive branch should let the judicial branch exercise its work without 
interference. All three powers should respect standards of the code of conduct in practice. 
The military budget should obey the principle of the 1996 financial law and the 1996 public 
accounting act. Any violation of these laws should be punished according to the law. 
Bribes, corruption, and nepotism in all public and security sectors should be discouraged 
and punished by law.191 Conversely, transparency and accountability should be promoted 
and enforced.  
Implementing these recommendations can improve civil-military relations, as well 
as control and effectiveness of the armed forces.  
 
                                                 
191 Anatole Ayissi and Nouhoum Sangaré, “Mali,” in Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The 
Processes and Mechanisms of Control, ed. Wuyi Omitoogun and Eboe Hutchful (Oxford: Oxford 
University/Sipri Publications, 2006). 
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